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Theory and Practice in Plato’s Theaetetus:
The Question of Knowledge and the Primacy of Dialectic
Tushar Irani, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University
SAGP Group Session, APA Pacific Division Meeting, March 2004
Most studies of the Theaetetus concentrate on Plato’s examination of Protagoras’s ‘Man is the Measure’ doctrine— 
and rightly so. The bulk of the dialogue is after all devoted to an exhaustive critique of this doctrine and its 
consequences, and in order to understand Plato’s views it is surely crucial to determine what position he sets up in 
contrast to his own. Commentators differ, however, when it comes to the finer points of Protagoras’s position— 
particularly concerning the validity of Plato’s infamous self-refutation argument against the Measure Doctrine at 
171A6-C7—and its relation to Heraclitean flux. After some preliminaries on the overall structure of the Theaetetus,
I single out in this paper two interpretations of the Measure Doctrine: Myles Bumyeat’s relativist reading and Gail 
Fine’s more recent infallibilist reading.
These interpretations require close investigation and comparison to determine which better fits Plato’s argument 
in the dialogue. Nonetheless, one of my aims here is to suggest that Plato allows both these readings of the Measure 
Doctrine: Protagoras’s position is inherently ambiguous, and by distinguishing between theoretical and practical 
objections to his doctrine, I argue that the Theaetetus provides a fitting response to both relativism and infallibilism. 
Furthermore, once Plato’s critiques of the Measure Doctrine and Heraclitean flux are read together, the 
consequences of Bumyeat’s and Fine’s interpretations turn out to be compatible. Plato’s strategy in this first part of 
the dialogue is to argue that Theaetetus’s empiricist theory of knowledge ultimately fails because it makes the 
shared agreements that are the touchstone of philosophical analysis either pointless or impossible. Before inquiring 
into the conditions for knowledge, therefore, he must first determine the conditions that make rational inquiry and 
discussion meaningful. Focusing on this latter demand assigns a purpose to the Theaetetus that has not yet been 
fully appreciated: a concern with the practice of dialectic. It also, I believe, yields some distinctly Platonic 
conclusions.
1. Sticking To Agreements
The word ‘agreement’ (homologein) occurs frequently throughout the Theaetetus. ^  One might even say the 
dialogue takes place on this basis, for at the outset of the work Socrates forces his young interlocutor to engage in 
discussion by holding him to a point they have both “agreed upon” Çhômologêmena, 145C3). Theaetetus has just 
granted at 145b 1-5 that it is important to consider how alike he and Socrates are—as Theodoms, his teacher, 
maintains earlier on in the work. Having secured this point Socrates compels him to participate in dialectic, 
asserting that “now is the time for you to show yourself and for me to examine you” (145B6-7). Theaetetus is 
forbidden, subsequently, from retreating from argument and instructed to have the courage (tharrôn, 145C5) to stick 
by his agreement (homologiai, 145c5).
It is on this basis that Plato’s most sustained investigation into the question of knowledge takes place. To be 
sure, the importance of agreement is highlighted all the way through the Theaetetus—most potently in Plato’s 
famous “exquisite” argument against Protagoras’s ‘Man is the Measure’ doctrine at 171a6-c7. The doctrine ends
up refuting itself, in fact, precisely on account of the agreements and admissions that Protagoras makes.1 2 The issue
1 The term and its cognates occur over forty times during the work. See Leonard Brandwood, A Word Index to 
Plato (Leeds: W.S. Maney and Son, 1976). All references to the Theaetetus in this paper are to The Theaetetus o f 
Plato, translated by M.J. Levett and revised by Myles Bumyeat (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1990), unless otherwise 
noted. In quoting the original Greek, I have followed John Burnet’s Platonis Opera (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1903).
2 The emphasis that the self-refutation passage places here on ‘agreeing’ has also been noted by Sarah Waterlow, 
“Protagoras and Inconsistency: Theaetetus 171A6-C7,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 59 (1977), pp. 29-32 
and by Ruby Blondell, The Play o f Character in Plato 's Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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I would like to focus on in this paper, however, is the way in which Plato regards agreement—not only between 
individuals, but in human judgement itself—to be even possible. Another way of phrasing this issue which is more 
clearly in tune with the stated theme of the Theaetetus is to ask what conditions are needed, for Plato, for the 
question 3 4 5What is knowledge?’ to be a meaningful one—a question that can be answered.
In tackling this problem, my method here will be to reorganise somewhat the way in which this dialogue has 
traditionally been read. On most interpretations, the Theaetetus is divided into three parts, in line with the three
major conceptions of knowledge that are developed in the work.^ Myles Bumyeat’s extensive commentary on the 
dialogue is a case in point—an analysis that is especially valuable for the thorough account provided of the 
development of Plato’s argument. Nevertheless, for reasons that will soon be clear, I find it just as valuable to 
consider the dialogue in an alternative way.
2. A Two-Part Reading of the Theaetetus
As I see it, the Theaetetus falls quite naturally into two separate parts that expound differing approaches to the
question of knowledge.^ On this reading, there are two lines of argument pursued in the dialogue, positioned neatly
before and after Socrates’ digression on the philosopher at 172c-177c.^ The first line adopts what is at least 
broadly-speaking an empiricist argument: all knowledge is drawn from experience or, more specifically, from 
perception. The slogan in this part of the dialogue, before the digression, can be summed up as ‘knowledge is found 
out there soniewhere.’ The mind or soul (psuchê) acts as a passive receptor of a great welter of experience that is 
ever-changing and indeterminate. Thus knowledge, too, becomes indeterminate.
In opposition, the second part of the dialogue pursues what I shall refer to here as an anti-empiricist argument: 
knowledge is to be located in a mind that is actively engaged in the world. The slogan here, after the digression, is
2002), pp. 268-70. Plato’s argument, very briefly, is as follows. Socrates takes Protagoras to agree (homologôn,
171 a8) that all men judge what is. As a consequence, Socrates declares, Protagoras is compelled by his doctrine to 
admit Çhomologei, 171B2) the falsity of his own opinion, since he also has to admit (homologei, 171B6) the truth of 
other people’s opinion who judge his doctrine to be wrong. It will therefore have to be agreed (homologêsetai,
171B10) by Protagoras that no one is the measure of anything at all. There are, of course, some major problems 
with this self-refutation passage, depending (at least in part) on how Protagoreanism should be understood in the 
Theaetetus. Compounding the difficulty here is the fact that we are dealing in this dialogue with Plato’s portrayal 
of Protagoras, which may or may not be a true depiction of the historical Protagoras. Be that as it may, I shan’t be 
concerned here with whether or not Protagoreanism is accurately represented in the Theaetetus. Plato’s portrayal of 
the doctrine remains a contentious enough issue as it is, and invites a number of differing interpretations, as we shall 
see.
3 Strictly speaking, four theses of knowledge are put forward in the Theaetetus: ‘knowledge is knowledge of a craft’ 
(146C7 ff.); ‘knowledge is perception’ (151E1 ff.); ‘knowledge is true judgement’ (187B5 ff.); and ‘knowledge is 
true judgement with an account’ (201C9 ff.). The second of these is usually taken to be Theaetetus’s first thesis in 
the dialogue (the text refers to it explicitly as his “first-born child” at 160E3), but the initial conception he submits 
at the start of the work, that knowledge is simply knowledge o f a particular craft, is an intuitive one that deserves 
close attention. We cannot dismiss it so hastily as circular when in fact the last conception of knowledge put 
forward in the dialogue remains as circular: knowledge is true judgement together with knowledge o f the 
differentness (210a4). (See also p. 3n. 8, below.) Still, in this paper I focus by and large on the three final theses 
that Theaetetus proposes, since it is these that receive extensive development in the dialogue, and which (as I will 
argue here) spell out the two different pictures of knowledge, mind, and world that Plato develops in the course of 
the Theaetetus.
4 This arrangement of the dialogue is hardly novel. Nicholas White provides a similar two-part account in his Plato 
on Knowledge and Reality (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), pp. 159-83. The account I offer in this paper differs from 
White’s mainly in that it’s crucial on my view to see how the two differing approaches to the question of knowledge 
provided in each part of the dialogue result in opposing conclusions for Plato.
5 Hence, one of the notable features of this arrangement of the Theaetetus is that it’s also consistent with the formal 
arrangement of the work, since the digression on the philosopher, as Bumyeat observes, “ is situated almost exactly 
at the midpoint of the dialogue” (The Theaetetus o f Plato, p. 35).
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expounded succinctly at 186D2-3: “knowledge is found not in the experiences (pathêmasin, 186d2) but in the 
process of reasoning (sullogismôi, 186d3) about them.” On this view, the mind is an active participator in the 
practice of acquiring knowledge—Plato’s inquiry shifts at this point from the tangible empirical world to the more 
intangible workings of the psuchê. The focus here is on processes of reasoning, calculation, and thought, which are 
described as activities of the mind or soul “when it is busy by itself about the things which are” (187A5-6). 
According to this argument, moreover, our knowledge of things is assumed to be determinate.
On the reading of the Theaetetus I have just outlined, 186D2-3 is clearly the single most important turning point 
in the dialogue. Socrates suggests as much, in fact, when he asks Theaetetus soon after to “[w]ipe out all that we
have said hitherto, and see if you can see any better from where you have now progressed to” (187b 1-2).^ I do not
take this interpretation to be controversial.^ All the same, it is crucial to see how Plato sketches two different 
approaches to the question of knowledge in the Theaetetus, which lead (at least for him) to starkly different results. 
My main aim in what follows is to spell out in detail some of these results in the first part of the dialogue— 
specifically, to draw attention to the salient features of Plato’s arguments here, as well as the substantive lessons he 
leaves us with.
I shall argue that Plato’s problem with the thesis that knowledge is perception in the first part of the Theaetetus 
is that it gives rise to intolerable absurdities and inconsistencies. This differs significantly, however, from the 
problem we are left with at the very end of the dialogue, since here it’s the fact that Theaetetus’s final conception of
knowledge (true judgement with a logos) remains intolerably circular.** To be sure, the second part leaves us with 
some difficult questions and formidable worries. Nonetheless, this second anti-empiricist approach overcomes the 
important defects of Theaetetus’s initial thesis. The question of knowledge is left unresolved at the end of the 
dialogue, but it is not incoherent: we have been provided with space for further discussion and inquiry—for 
language—and this is surely no mean feat.
My study here is principally concerned with expanding on this last point. What are the defects of an empiricist 
approach to knowledge? How are these defects brought to light in the Theaetetus and in what way does the 
approach that Plato favours remedy such problems? I claim above that the first part of the dialogue generates 
“absurdities” and “inconsistencies” for Plato. But these are subtly different criticisms. So then: how does the view 
that knowledge is perception turn out to be absurd? How is it inconsistent? Socrates connects this thesis from the 
very beginning with Protagoras’s ‘Man is the Measure’ doctrine (151e8-152a4). Protagoras’s theory is 
subsequently connected with another “secret doctrine,” namely, Heraclitean Flux (152C8-E1). It will be worth our 
while, therefore, to spend time examining each of these theories to see why Plato believes they entail one another.
Much work has been devoted to this issue. Recent scholarship has focused especially on interpreting and 
assessing the validity of Plato’s argument here in linking Protagoras’s and Heraclitus’s doctrines with Theaetetus’s 
empiricist conception of knowledge. Doing full justice to these interpretations is beyond the scope of this paper and 
would, furthermore, detract from its purpose, which is to determine whether or not the Theaetetus provides us 
ultimately with anything philosophically constructive. Hence, by considering the defects of an empiricist approach 
to knowledge in the first part of the dialogue, I hope to anticipate some of the more positive conclusions that Plato 
reaches later on, where he develops an anti-empiricist conception of knowledge. In doing so, we shall have 678
6 1 know of no other dialogue in which such a claim is made. Taken at face value, it’s almost as though Socrates is 
saying here that the entire first part of the Theaetetus is worthless. But if this is the case, why does Plato go to such 
lengths to work out an empiricist view of knowledge in the dialogue? Why does he not begin instead at 186D2-3? 
As I shall argue here, the first part of the dialogue is by no means worthless—Plato draws our attention to what an 
empiricist view of knowledge commits us to, and in this respect there are some clear lessons to be learned.
7 John Cooper in particular stresses this view in “Plato On Sense-Perception and Knowledge (Theaetetus 184- 
186),” in Plato, edited by Gail Fine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 357-78. Michael Frede’s 
“Observation in Plato’s Later Dialogues” in this volume (pp. 379-85) is also invaluable here.
8 The circularity here is the last problem we are left with in the dialogue: Theaetetus’s final definition of knowledge 
as ‘true judgement with an account’ (201C9 ff.) is found to be wanting since no other definition of ‘account’ can be 
given by Socrates except ‘knowledge of the differentness’ that distinguishes the unknown object from other objects 
(210a4). The final definition thus cashes out to: ‘knowledge is true judgement with knowledge of the 
differentness.’ See also p. 2n. 3, above.
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occasion to note some of the nuances of Protagoras’s and Heraclitus’s doctrines in connection with Theaetetus’s 
proposal that knowledge is perception, but remarks on finer points will have to be abbreviated.
3. Three Doctrines of Empiricism
How, then, do these three empiricist theories hang together? Plato develops an argument in the first part of the 
dialogue that combines a theory of judgement (Protagoras) with a theory of the world (Heraclitus), which together 
are assumed in some way to support Theaetetus’s definition of knowledge as perception. But it is not at all clear, 
first, how we should understand these theories and, second, whether they are in fact interrelated. I shall examine 
them here in the same order that Plato does after Socrates’ digression (177c ff.), where he provides us with a recap 
of the three doctrines before dispelling them and developing a new approach to the question of knowledge.
(PM) Protagoras 's Measure Doctrine. “Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, 
and of the things which are not, that they are not” (152A1-4). Protagoras’s well-known thesis makes an 
early appearance in the Theaetetus and is significant enough to merit Socrates’ consideration for almost
half the dialogue—no other theory, as a matter of fact, preoccupies him to the same extent.^ Plato 
certainly found it important to contend with Protagoras, and expects us to do the same in considering the 
manifold implications of his doctrine.
(HF) Heraclitus 's Flux Doctrine. “[T]here is nothing which in itself is just one thing: nothing which you could 
rightly call anything or any kind of thing.. . .  What is really true is this: the things of which we naturally 
say that they ‘are’, are in process of coming to be, as the result of movement and change and blending with 
one another. We are wrong when we say they ‘are’, since nothing ever is, but everything is coming to be” 
(152d3-e1). This doctrine is associated with PM many times in the Theaetetus, and invoked specifically 
for support together with its guiding principle “that everything is really motion (kinèsis), and there is 
nothing but motion” (156a4-5).
(KP) Knowledge is Perception. Theaetetus’s “first-born” thesis receives a provisional formulation at 15lEl-3 
and is thrashed out along with PM and HF until 160d5, at which point Socrates .submits the doctrine in its 
entirety. Protagoras’s and Heraclitus’s theories thus come to supply Theaetetus with the hypothetical 
conditions that are required for his thesis to stand up to scrutiny, and it is on this basis that Socrates 
proceeds to refute empiricism. In particular, by spelling out the conditions that Theaetetus needs to support 
his definition of knowledge as perception, Plato suggests that the empiricist’s argument amounts to a
reductio ad absurdum. * ®
That Plato believes these three theories are connected in the Theaetetus is apparent from the dialogue’s many “stage 
directions,” as Bumyeat terms them. At 160d5-e3, for instance, Socrates maintains rather emphatically that “the 
various theories have converged to the same thing: that of Homer and Heraclitus and all their tribe, that all things 
flow like streams; of Protagoras, wisest of men, that man is the measure of all things; and of Theaetetus that, these 910
9 There is good reason for this: as stated here, the quote that Plato attributes to Protagoras can be interpreted in 
many ways. It seems indeed to be a feature of this doctrine that it cannot be pinned down too easily. Moreover, in 
light of the several interpretations of Socrates’ argument against Protagoras that commentators have offered, it is 
safe to say that Plato does not provide us in the Theaetetus with an explicit reading of PM. This is fitting, for the 
indefinite content of Protagoras’s dictum is along these lines reflected further in its indefinite form. It is a testament 
to Plato’s devotion to philosophy that he nevertheless wrestles so hard with the consequences of this obscure thesis.
10 I take this point from Bumyeat, who proposes in his commentary that Plato’s refutation of Theaetetus’s thesis in 
the first part of the dialogue is an indirect proof or reductio, whereby KP supplies the materials for its own 
refutation independently (The Theaetetus o f Plato, p. 53). Bumyeat credits Bernard Williams primarily with this 
view (p. xiii), and expands upon it at great length in “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and 
Berkeley Missed,” in Idealism Past and Present, edited by Godfrey Vesey (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), pp. 21-4.
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things being so, knowledge proves to be perception.” It will therefore be important to keep track of the manoeuvres
at work in the Theaetetus that link PM, HF, and KP together. ^
Before reviewing these doctrines in further detail, however, it is worth affirming at the outset what I take to be 
Plato’s underlying concern in this part of the dialogue. Most readers, I presume, will agree that Theaetetus’s 
empiricist conception of knowledge is understood by Plato to be committed to and supported by a Protagorean 
epistemology which, in turn, is committed to and supported by a Heraclitean ontology. But as I shall argue here, 
these doctrines also have something to say about the validity of human inquiry, and this is an issue of central 
importance to Plato in the Theaetetus. Specifically, based on PM and HF; the prospect of reaching agreements—in 
language and in judgement—is thrown into doubt. On this view, not only is the question of knowledge an empty 
one, but all philosophical investigations are deemed to be either pointless or (worse) meaningless. Much more, 
then, is at stake in this dialogue than the theoretical question of knowledge alone. By refuting the three empiricist 
doctrines that make up the first part of the Theaetetus and defending his own anti-empiricist position, Plato will be 
making a case for philosophy: inquiry will be justified as a worthwhile enterprise, and the agreements we reach will 
be meaningful.
4. Protagoras’s Measure Doctrine: A Dark Saying
Protagoras’s Measure Doctrine is a claim about human judgement: it purports to reveal something about how we 
assess experience, namely, that things ‘are’ only what they appear to be and that no one person’s ‘truth’ is more 
correct than another’s. But stated in this way his thesis is notoriously hard to comprehend. To begin with, does it
apply to perceptual appearances alone or to any appearances whatsoever?^ Plato, for his part, interprets PM in 
both ways: at 152A-169D, the thesis is applied solely to the perceptual realm, while at 169D-172B it is construed 
more broadly to cover ethical and political questions. (In an attempt to give Protagoras a fair hearing, Socrates 
adopts his argument at 166a2 ff. and actually defends the doctrine by applying it to both perceptual and non- 
perceptual appearances.) For our purposes here, this is a minor issue and we can take PM in its broadest sense to be 
a claim about all kinds of human judgement. It is clearly this wide-ranging application of the doctrine that 
commands Plato’s attention in the Theaetetus.
Things get much trickier, though, when it comes to saying anything more about Protagoras’s theory. In 
particular, debate has centred on the idea of truth that is at issue or implicit in Plato’s reading of PM. Should the 
doctrine be interpreted as propounding a relativist or a subjectivist conception of truth? The difference between 
these two interpretations turns on whether Protagoras is making a claim about judgement in which an appearance is
merely true with regard to each individual, or a more global claim in which all appearances are absolutely true. ^  If 
Protagoras subscribes to the former idea, he is a relativist; if he subscribes to the latter, he is a subjectivist. These
interpretations have been defended, respectively, by Myles Bumyeat and Gail Fine. ^  Since both of them are 1234
11 This amounts to fulfilling what Gäil Fine has suitably termed the “connection criterion,” by which she means 
that Protagoras’s, Heraclitus’s, and Theaetetus’s theories should be interpreted so that they are all committed to and 
best supported by one another. See Gail Fine, “Protagorean Relativisms,” Proceedings o f the Boston Area 
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 10, edited by J.J. Cleary and W. Wians (Lanham: University Press of America, 
1995), pp. 216-7. There are many passages in the Theaetetus that aim to connect the three theories in this manner. 
At 151e8-152a4, KP and PM amount to the same thing; at 152C8-10, HF is considered the “secret doctrine” ofPM; 
and at 156A3-5, Socrates argues to the effect that HF implies PM. For more of these “stage-directions” see 
Bumyeat (1990), p. 9.
12 The verb ‘appears’ (phaino) conveys the same ambiguity in Greek as it does in English. How things appear to 
me can refer to a sensory judgement (sweet, green, cold, etc.) or to any judgement at all (beautiful, equal, just, etc.). 
Fine (1995), pp. 213-4 labels these views “Narrow Protagoreanism” and “ Broad Protagoreanism” respectively.
13 Following Bumyeat and Fine, I shall be using ‘absolutely true’ and ‘true (period)’ interchangeably in this paper.
14 Bumyeat considers a subjectivist reading of PM in “Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Later Greek Philosophy,” 
Philosophical Review 85 (1976), pp. 44-69 but argues that Plato provides a “ more authentic” relativist reading of 
the doctrine in “Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Plato’s Theaetetus,” Philosophical Review 85 (1976), pp. 172-95. 
This argument is implicit in Bumyeat (1982), p. 25 where the relevant “states of affairs” that PM describes should 
be “understood relativistically,” and is presupposed in Bumyeat (1990), pp. 19-31. Fine argues against this reading
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furthermore rather credible readings of PM, they are useful for us here as we examine the defects that Plato locates 
in this empiricist doctrine. For if some common criticism of Protagoras can be gleaned from these two analyses, 
then it may reasonably be claimed that we have unearthed something essential about Plato’s argument in this part of 
the Theaetetus.
Why PM is explicated so ambiguously in the dialogue to invite such diverse interpretations is another matter— 
although, no doubt, an important one. My own view is that Plato represents Protagoras’s thesis in an obscure
fashion simply because the doctrine itself, as quoted at 152A1-4, is cloaked in obscurity.^ We are given just one 
sentence of Protagoras’s text, and it is an open question whether Plato himself had anything more substantial than 
this fragment to work with. By its nature, then, PM remains ambiguous: Socrates refers to the dictum at 152C9-10 
as a “riddle” or dark saying (êinixato) delivered to the masses, while its hidden meaning must be teased out. 
Likewise at 155D9-E1, he maintains that the “veiled truth” (alêtheian apokekrummenên, 155D10) of Protagoras 
needs to be revealed, and at 156a2 he speaks of the concealed “mysteries” (jnustêria) of the doctrine. Anything that 
is said over and above what is quoted explicitly in the thesis will therefore be speculative. But it is necessary to 
embark on such speculation if PM is to be interpreted as making any sort of contribution to the empiricist’s 
argument in the Theaetetus, and to see what position Plato sets up in contrast to his own. Both Bumyeat’s and 
Fine’s interpretations of the doctrine supply Protagoras with a strong case in this regard, although they differ of 
course on what exactly he is saying and thus what Plato himself is arguing against. The point I shall press here, 
however, is that whether Protagoras is taken to be a relativist (as Bumyeat argues) or a subjectivist (as Fine argues), 
at least one implication of his thesis remains clear. In either case, the doctrine entails grave consequences for 
language and, particularly, for the practices of discussion, reflection, and inquiry: for dialectic.
5. Protagoras as Relativist: Burnyeat’s Reading
Let us begin with Bumyeat’s reading. Protagoras is widely regarded as the father of relativism. His declaration 
“Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they 
are not” certainly has a nice relativistic ring to it. And Socrates’ paraphrase of this principle as a claim that “as each 
thing appears to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so it is for you” (152A6-8) seems to corroborate such a 
reading. It is natural, consequently, to interpret PM along with Bumyeat as the theory of “a relativist who
maintained that every judgment is true for (in relation to) the person whose judgment it is.”^  156
in “Relativism and Self-Refutation: Plato, Protagoras, and Bumyeat,” in Method in Ancient Philosophy, edited by 
Jyl Gentzler (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 137-63 and in Fine (1995). She maintains, in contrast, that Plato 
portrays Protagoras as a subjectivist, and develops this interpretation (which she terms ‘infallibilism’) extensively in 
“Plato’s Refutation of Protagoras in the Theaetetus,” Apeiron 31 (1998), pp. 201-34. Other commentators have 
also disagreed with Bumyeat’s reading while still interpreting PM to be some form of relativism. The most 
convincing of these include Mohan Matthen, “Perception, Relativism, and Truth: Reflections on Plato’s Theaetetus 
152-160,” Dialogue 24 (1985), pp. 33-58 and Richard Kètchum, “ Plato’s ‘Refutation’ of Protagorean Relativism: 
Theaetetus 170-171,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 10 (1992), pp. 73-105. But Fine’s account is unique in 
arguing for a totally different (subjectivist/infal 1 ibi 1 ist) reading of PM, and acts therefore as the best foil to 
Bumyeat’s account.
15 This is surely related to the fact that Protagoras’s dictum existed for Plato in the form of a text, just as it exists for 
us today. Protagoras would have been dead for about twenty years by the dramatic date this conversation between 
Socrates and Theaetetus is said to have occurred (shortly before Socrates’ death), and for at least fifty years by the 
time the dialogue was composed (shortly after Theaetetus’s death). In the Phaedrus, Plato depicts the written word 
famously as something unable to answer questions and be examined, because “it always needs its father’s support; 
alone, it can neither defend itself nor come to its own support” (275E3-5). Given this general suspicion of texts, it is 
likely that Plato thinks the study of Protagoras’s thesis is doomed from the get-go (though see also p. 4n. 9, above). 
The Theaetetus actually describes PM in line with this metaphor from the Phaedrus as a hapless “orphan” without 
its “father” (164E2-3), and highlights the written nature of the doctrine often (see 152a4, 162A2-3, 166c8, 166d 1-2, 
169d 10-e2, 170e9-171a 1). The best analysis of this subject that I have found is Andrew Ford’s “Protagoras’ Head: 
Interpreting Philosophic Fragments in Theaetetus,” American Journal o f Philology 115 (1994), pp. 199-218.
16 Bumyeat (1976), p. 172. Of course, an accurate reading of Protagoras’s position cannot stop here but must also 
draw on other passages in the Theaetetus, as Bumyeat proceeds to do. The chief sections in this regard are found at
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Now, the problem with reading PM in this way is familiar. At many stages in his arguments against the 
doctrine, Plato crucially drops the relativising qualifiers that Protagoras would demand for his thesis. In these cases, 
Socrates represents Protagoras as saying that all judgements are true (period), rather than true for so-and-so. This 
objection has been made repeatedly in reply to Plato’s self-refutation argument against PM at 170A ff. in the 
dialogue. There, Socrates contends that even if Protagoras himself believes that his theory is true, most people 
believe that PM is false. And for this reason alone, Socrates suggests, the doctrine is self-refuting: if all judgements 
are true, then the judgement that PM is false must also be true. On the face of it, the blatant contradiction here 
seems to be a neat way of undermining Protagoras. But Plato has disregarded the relativisation of truth that is 
ostensibly at the heart of his theory. Protagoras might be making a craftier point—not that all judgements are 
absolutely true, but that they are true for the individual who holds them. Previously, Socrates had stuck to this 
principle with deliberate care. Hence, as Bumyeat notes, it is puzzling that Plato drops the relativising qualifiers at 
the “climactic moment” of his argument by “foisting” on Protagoras the unrelativised premise that all judgements
are true (period).17 18920In this passage, as well as others, Socrates seems to beg the question against relativism.
The issue here is whether the lesson Plato wants to draw—that PM is false not merely for someone or the other
but absolutely false—can be derived without the illicit omission of these relativising qualifiers.1^ Bumyeat affirms 
that this can be done once the qualifiers are restored appropriately at 171A6-C7 and that Plato’s self-refutation 
argument against relativism is as a result sound. But other commentators have been less optimistic about the 
validity of this argument. First of all, if Plato is serious about refuting relativism, why does he drop these truth- 
qualifiers to begin with? In the preliminary stages before the self-refutation passage Socrates appears quite eager to 
keep them in place (see, e.g., 170A3-4). Yet as we have noted, they are omitted afterwards at important junctures in 
his argument. There are, moreover, other periods in the dialogue where PM is stated or purportedly refuted and the
qualifiers we would expect on a relativist reading are missing. ^  Second, Bumyeat argues that there is an 
assumption couched in the self-refutation passage that Plato takes as a given in his argument, namely, “if relativism
is not true for someone, it does not hold of that person’s judgments and beliefs.”^  Once this assumption is granted, 
the argument indeed turns out to be sound—it validates a move from ‘true for so-and-so’ to ‘true o f so-and-so’s 
judgements’ which means that Protagoras, as a relativist, would have to concede that since there is at least one 
person (i.e., Socrates) who judges PM to be false, his doctrine does not hold of that person’s judgements/beliefs. 
That is to say, PM does not describe at least one person’s judgements. Therefore PM is absolutely false, even for 
Protagoras, since it claims to describe something about all human judgement.
This is surely a resourceful account of the self-refutation passage, for when Bumyeat’s assumption is accepted 
and the relativising truth-qualifiers are restored at 171A6-C7, Plato’s argument works splendidly. But would a
stubborn relativist accept this assumption?^1 Bumyeat remarks in connection elsewhere that “what it means for the
152a-160d, where the three empiricist theses are elaborated in detail; 161C-164B, where Socrates begins to express 
some qualms concerning Protagoras’s doctrine; 164E-168C, including an important passage where Socrates attempts 
to “rescue” the doctrine; 169D-172B, including the critical argument at 171A6-C7 where PM is found to refute 
itself; and 177C-179C, after the digression, where all that has been said is reviewed and Protagoras is finally laid to 
rest.
17 Bumyeat (1976), p. 174.
18 That Plato wants to derive this strong a claim is clear from Socrates’ conclusion to the self-refutation argument, 
where he affirms that Protagoras’s theory “is not true for anyone at all,” not even for Protagoras himself (171C5-7). 
This latter contention is remarkable: Plato seems to be hinting that Protagoras disbelieved his own doctrine, that he 
wrote it insincerely. (Cf. 152C9-10 where Socrates asks if PM was issued “as a riddle for the common crowd of 
us,” and 161E3-4 where he asks whether Protagoras was perhaps “just playing to the crowd” in devising his 
theory.)
19 In addition to the self-refutation passage, Fine lists 152C1-2, 158d4, 162a 1, 166d 1-2, 167a7-9, 167C1, 169d- 
170c, and 179C1-2 (“Relativism and Self-Refutation,” p. 162n. 54).
20 Bumyeat (1976), p. 179. Fine concludes in “Relativism and Self-Refutation” that this is the central assumption 
on which Bumyeat’s reading of Plato’s argument depends (pp. 162-3).
21 Many critics weigh in on this issue. David Bostock, Plato's Theaetetus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 90- 
1 states that while Bumyeat’s defence of Plato’s argument here is an “ ingenious reconstruction,” Protagoras need 
not accept the assumption on which it relies: “On [Bumyeat’s] account, a claim is taken to be ‘true for x’ if and only
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Measure doctrine to be false for someone is that he is not a Protagorean measure: which is to say that his mere belief 
in a proposition is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the proposition to be true in some relativistic
sense.”22 But this certainly begs the question against relativism. For Protagoras would insist here that his “mere 
belief’ in something—how it appears to him—is in fact both a necessary and a sufficient condition for it to be true 
(for him). This is exactly what PM should be saying when interpreted relativistically. By negating this claim in an 
assumption of his argument against PM instead of deriving the negation from premises that Protagoras might agree 
to, Plato is (on this view) sidestepping the issue. Protagoras would hence challenge and, I imagine, doggedly reject 
the assumption that “if relativism is not true for someone, it does not hold of that person’s judgments and beliefs.” 
And it is easy to see why, for if he permitted this point he would be giving the game away to Plato at the outset of
their argument. Without the assumption, however, the line of reasoning at 171A6-C7 is invalid.^
6. Protagoras as Infallibilist: Fine’s Reading
So how can we rescue Plato’s arguments against PM? Recall that our reading of Protagoras has up until now been 
pretty much in line with Bumyeat’s relativist interpretation. That is, we have understood PM to deny the existence 
of absolute truths and regarded Protagoras instead to be saying that all judgements are true fo r  (in relation to) each
individuals^ But PM does not have to be read in this way, and Gail Fine has offered a convincing account of 
Protagoras that does not compel us to restore the qualifiers when they are missing in the self-refutation passage and 
in Plato’s other arguments against PM, such as 179C1-2 above. On this view, Protagoras is not a relativist but an 234
if it is a description of x’s world which is true (of that world) in an absolute and objective way. It simply states the 
truth about that world, not specially for x, or indeed for anyone, but absolutely.” Yet a relativist would certainly 
dispute a move from ‘true for’ to ‘true o f  in this way. To be fair, Bumyeaf s account is more nuanced than my 
portrayal of it (and, I think, Bostock’s as well) allows. What the move from ‘true for’ to ‘true o f  is intended to spell 
out is the fact that PM is committed to describing something about the world(s) of each person, which connects the 
doctrine to an ontology of private objects or Heraclitean flux. But even here there’s a problem, as Fine argues, for 
this view of PM (which she dubs “private absolutism”) conflicts with Bumyeat’s previous view of the doctrine as a 
strictly relativist thesis. A strict relativist would not be committed to any ontology at all. Furthermore, on either of 
these two views, Bumyeat’s argument turns out to beg the question against relativism (“Relativism and Self- 
Refutation,” pp. 157-9). Ketchum ( 1992), pp. 85-6 also objects to Bumyeaf s key assumption. On the other hand, 
Waterlow (1977), pp. 32-5 seems to maintain something like Bumyeaf s second view of PM, although she differs 
from Bumyeat in suggesting that Plato doesn’t aim to refute this kind of relativism. See also Fine, “Relativism and 
Self-Refutation,” p. 157n. 44.
22 Bumyeat (1976), p. 188. Derived from 171C1-3, although see Fine, “Relativism and Self-Refutation,” pp. 162- 
3. ·
23 I must for the sake of concision, baldly state this without further analysing the self-refutation passage in terms of a 
relativist reading of PM. Perhaps there are other interpretations of relativism that vindicate Plato’s argument here. 
Matthen (1985), pp. 56-7 gestures at one of thèse. Fine (1995) considers and rejects other relativist approaches.
24 At this point, an interesting question arises: should PM be read as promoting a theory of truth? Bumyeat (1976), 
p. 181 clearly thinks so: “Protagoras’ theory is, after all, a theory of truth and á theory of truth must link judgments 
to something else—the world, as philosophers often put it, though for a relativist the world has to be relativized to 
each individual.” It is for just this reason, Bumyeat affirms, that PM is committed to a Heraclitean ontology of flux. 
But note that nowhere in Socrates’ statement of the doctrine at 152A1-4, nor when he paraphrases it at 152A6-8 and 
elsewhere (e.g., 170A3-4), is there a mention of truth as such. This has lead many commentators to doubt that PM 
should be interpreted as a theory of truth at all. Ketchum (1992), pp. 74-6 is particularly good here and stresses that 
Plato often formulates PM simply in terms of being: ‘If X  seems F to 5 then A" is F for S ' In this sense the locutions 
‘true for X ,’ ‘cold for X ,’ ‘good for X ,’ etc. would all be on a par with one another. Matthen (1985), p. 57 likewise 
claims in his analysis of Protagoras’s Heraclitean strategy that PM is “primarily about being, not truth.” To be sure, 
Protagoras is said in the Theaetetus to have written a work titled Truth with PM as its opening sentence (161C3-7), 
but as Ketchum observes this title could just as well have been meant to describe its subject matter rather than 
promote a complex semantic theory (p. 76n. 7). See also Fine, “Relativism and Self-Refutation,” p. 140n. 10.
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infallibilist who holds that all judgements are absolutely true. This is a position we labelled ‘subjectivism’ earlier,
but because Fine prefers the term ‘infallibilism’ I shall henceforth stick to her expressions.25
The first thing to notice about this infallibilist reading of PM is that the qualifier ‘for so-and-so’ is not required 
after ‘true’ when Plato reiterates Protagoras’s position. The way things appear to be are the way they truly are 
(period). In conjunction with this thesis, Fine also attributes to Protagoras the converse rule that things truly are the
way they appear to be.2^ One implication of her analysis is thus instantly obvious: Plato drops the qualifiers in his 
arguments against PM because he thinks that Protagoras does not require them, and if this is the case we need not 
object to their absence. On Bumyeat’s interpretation, we found that Plato cannot drop these truth-qualifiers without 
begging the question against relativism. In contrast, Fine maintains that PM does not propound a revisionary theory 
of truth (as Bumyeat supposes) but rather “an account of the conditions under which statements are true: they are
true if and only if believed.”27 289As a result, Protagoras on this interpretation holds that all
judgements/beliefs/appearances are guaranteed to be true—they are infallible—absolutely true or true (period). The 
move that Plato frequently makes from ‘/? is true for so-and-so’ to ‘/? is true (period)’ in expounding PM is, along 
these lines, justified.
There are further benefits of Fine’s interpretation. Historically, Protagoras has not been portrayed as a relativist 
by other ancient commentators (notably, Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus), but as someone who regarded all 
judgements to be absolutely true—that is, as an infallibilist. In addition, these commentators often employ 
arguments to refute PM that are strikingly akin to the self-refutation passage we find in the Theaetetus. It is thus of
some historical benefit that on Fine’s analysis Plato is, as she says, “not the odd man out.”2** But by far, the 
principal advantage of Fine’s interpretation is that Plato succeeds in refuting Protagoras on an infallibilist reading of 
the Measure Doctrine. Her arguments here are in general compelling, especially with regard to the self-refutation
passage.2^ For instance, on an infallibilist interpretation of PM we see clearly how Plato can argue without begging 
the question against Protagoras that (i) if PM: all judgements are true (period), then (ii) the judgement that PM is 
false must be true (period), in which case (iii) PM is false. As an infallibilist, Protagoras must accept premises (i) 
and (ii), and come to the conclusion finally that his theory is inconsistent. Plato’s argument is valid. In fact, upon 
examining other passages in the dialogue that are problematic on a relativist conception of PM, we find that in each 
case Plato succeeds in refuting Protagoras once he is understood as an infallibilist.
On the face of it, this is a rather banal conclusion. For isn’t an infallibilist interpretation of PM bound to be 
self-refuting? In the case of conflicting appearances, it would seem to be patently inconsistent for Protagoras to 
maintain that, say, my feeling that the wind is cold and your feeling that the wind is not cold are both absolutely true 
accounts of the way things are. Bumyeat, accordingly, describes infallibilism as a thesis that no one would be likely
25 Fine (1995), p. 239n. 58. Fine remarks here that her reading of PM is the same view Bumyeat calls subjectivism, 
but she favours the term ‘infallibilism’ since ‘subjectivism’ has been used in a variety of ways. E.g., a subjectivist is 
often assumed to hold that all objects and properties are mental entities, but an infallibilist does not make this claim. 
An infallibilist, rather, claims that “(i) all beliefs are absolutely true, and (ii) there are no truths that are not believed: 
p  is true if and only if it is believed” (Fine, “Plato’s Refutation of Protagoras,” p. 205).
26 Note that although Fine seems to reject this biconditional in “Relativism and Self-Refutation,” p. 140, she 
retracts that claim in “Plato’s Refutation of Protagoras,” p. 205n. 12.
27 Fine, “Plato’s Refutation of Protagoras,” p. 206. In saying that Protagoras does not have a theory of truth or any 
“novel understanding of the truth predicate,” Fine appears to be in basic agreement with Waterlow (1977), pp. 32-3 
and Ketchum (1992), pp. 74-6. See also p. 8n. 24, above.
28 Fine, “Plato’s Refutation of Protagoras,” pp. 203-4. For more on the historical Protagoras, see Bumyeat (1976), 
pp. 44-7 and Fine, “ Relativism and Self-Refütation,” p. 137n. 3.
29 A thorough account of Fine’s reading is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. She divides, rightly I 
think, the self-refutation passage into a series of interrelated arguments: (i) 170A-C; (ii) 170C5-E6; and (iii) 170e7- 
171d8, in which the well-known “ exquisite” argument is a part. These arguments are analysed in detail on the 
assumption that Plato is challenging an infallibilist interpretation of PM and each is found to be a valid refutation of 
Protagoras’s doctrine. Fine also helpfully explains at many stages in her analysis why Plato’s arguments would be 
either invalid or question-begging on a relativist interpretation of PM (“Plato’s Refutation of Protagoras,” pp. 208- 
34).
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to defend, since it is “in clear violation of the law of contradiction.”^  If this really were the view of Protagoras, it’s 
hard to see why Plato should dwell on the Measure Doctrine so arduously. A relativist reading of PM, on the other 
hand, seems to be a far more sophisticated thesis. Along these lines, Protagoras would claim that my feeling that the 
wind is cold remains true for me, while your feeling that the wind is not cold remains true for you. And we have 
already seen the difficulties that arise in refuting this version of PM.
Fine argues in reply, however, that infallibilism is not in clear violation of the law of contradiction. The 
subtlety of Protagoras’s doctrine is that it appeals for support to a Heraclitean ontology wherein the world consists 
of objects that are continually in a process of change. In this sense, infallibilism turns out to be a more plausible 
theory: Protagoras would claim here that our judgements of the world do not really conflict because the world itself 
is in constant flux. The reason why the wind feels cold to me and not to you is simply because we are experiencing
different winds.3 * And with this response, Fine can assert that her reading of PM has yet another advantage over 
Bumyeat’s version. For if Protagoras were a relativist, he would not be committed to any ontology at all: relativism 
denies that there’s a way the world really is and that there are absolute truths. Such a thesis would not therefore 
reconcile the problem of conflicting appearances by relying on an ontological principle but, as Fine notes, “by
interpreting the truth predicate in a novel way, or by denying that any propositions are flat-out true.”3^
In allowing for the presence of absolute truths, then, an infallibilist reading of PM has an additional plus-point 
over a relativist reading. For the Theaetetus frequently represents PM in association with HF, a doctrine which
takes it to be an absolute truth that the world is in constant change.33 If Protagoras were a relativist, however, he 
would be making use of a certain standard here—in this case a standard of flux, but a standard nevertheless—and 
this would go against his renunciation of all independent standards, absolute truths, norms, and universal measures. 
That is to say, a strict relativist should deny that there’s an objective way in which things really are, but this is just 
what Heraclitus’s doctrine purports to describe.
Again, I find this argument persuasive. Fine’s assessment of PM is on the whole very successful in spelling out 
the connection between Protagoras’s thesis and Heraclitus’s doctrine of flux, which we shall examine in more detail 
shortly. But before doing so, there is a lingering concern that requires attention. Our first objection to Bumyeat’s 
relativist interpretation of PM was that it couldn’t account for Plato’s exclusion of the relativistic truth-qualifiers in 
his arguments against Protagoras. An objection to Fine’s infallibilist analysis asks the opposite: why are these 
qualifiers present at all? For example, at numerous points in the self-refutation passage, Plato employs the clause 
‘true for so-and-so’ in a way that is quite congenial to a relativist reading of the Measure Doctrine. Socrates in fact 
emphasises to Theodorus at 170D5-6 that while examining PM he will “assume with Protagoras that your judgment
is true for yow.”3^ \ χ  seems odd indeed, therefore, that Plato should draw our attention to these qualifiers so 
conspicuously. 30124
30 Bumyeat (1976), p. 46. Bumyeat’s target in this article is Sextus Empiricus’s ‘subjectivist’ reading of PM, which 
is essentially the same reading Fine terms ‘infallibilism.’ See p. 9n. 25, above.
31 Note the different strategies employed here by a relativist and an infallibilist in justifying conflicting appearances. 
The relativist appeals to something peculiar about human judgement: I experience the wind in one special way and 
you experience it in another special way. The infallibilist, however, appeals to something peculiar about the world: 
the wind itself has undergone a change, so we are not in fact talking about the same appearance. This difference 
will prove to be of key importance when we turn to examine Heraclitus’s flux doctrine in Section 10.
32 Fine, “Plato’s Refutation of Protagoras,” p. 208. An infallibilist interpretation of PM, on the other hand, “does 
not have an unusual understanding of the truth predicate, nor does it deny that any propositions are flat-out true,” 
which commits it to an ontology of flux in explaining conflicting appearances. See also Fine (1995), pp. 240-2.
33 Recall how, right at the beginning of his exposition of Protagoras’s thesis, Socrates describes Heraclitean flux as 
its “secret doctrine” (152C8-E1).
34 See also 1 70a3-4 and 1 70e4-5. Fine, “Plato’s Refutation of Protagoras,” pp. 218-20 admits that this might seem 
to be a problem for her reading, but counters that “whether the qualifiers support relativism depends on how they 
are understood.” On her understanding, then, the qualifiers do not invoke an unusual conception of relative truth, 
nor do they prevent the suggestion that any propositions are absolutely true. “Rather, to say that p  is true for A but 
false for others is only to say that p  is true in A’s view, but false in the view of others; that is, A thinks that p  is true, 
whereas others think that it is false.” The dative case in the Greek (so i. . .  alêthes, 170D5-6) should therefore be 
read as the dative of ‘person judging’—i.e., as simply expressing the judgement of a person. Fine cites Waterlow
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This issue leads to a more general problem. One reason I have dwelt at length on Bumyeat’s analysis of PM is 
to highlight how natural it is to interpret Protagoras as a relativist. Could Plato really have been so blind to this 
inteipretation? Based on Fine’s analysis, we have to assume that Plato was either unaware of a relativist reading of 
PM or, if he was aware of it, that he didn’t feel confident in his abilities to refute relativism. Two questions thus 
arise: first, does a relativist interpretation of Protagoras’s doctrine occur to Plato? Second, why can’t he refute 
relativism? To wrap up our examination of PM, I shall suggest that a relativist reading of the doctrine does in fact 
occur to Plato. I shall argue further that the reason he does not prove this theory inconsistent in the way he refutes 
infallibilism is because a relativist reading of PM does not admit of being a theory at all. Rather, Plato rejects 
relativism for practical purposes.
7. Relativism Revisited
At 152A-160D, Socrates elaborates in great detail on PM and HF to flesh out Theaetetus’s definition that knowledge 
is perception. In particular, the passage is concerned with developing Protagoras’s account of judgement by 
connecting it to Heraclitean flux. Plato thus expounds an intricate theory of perception in which “all things become 
relatively to something” (157b 1) between an active world in flux on the one hand and a passive agent on the other. 
Towards the end of the passage, the following is deduced:
. . . whether you apply the term ‘being’ to a thing or the term ‘becoming’, you must always use the words ‘for 
somebody’ or ‘of something’ or ‘relatively to something’. You must not speak of anything as in itself either being 
or becoming nor let anyone else use such expressions. That is the meaning of the theory we have been expounding. 
(160b8-c2)
And to round things off, Socrates associates this theory explicitly at 160C8-9 with Protagoras’s thesis that “I am 
judge . . .  of things that are, that they are, for me; and of things that are not, that they are not.” Now it’s hard in the 
light of such passages to see how Plato could not be understanding PM in some way as a relativist thesis. Yet we 
have already noted that when it comes to disproving the doctrine, the Theaetetus is read most convincingly as 
arguing against infallibilism. Why then doesn’t Plato devote himself equally to refuting relativism when such an 
interpretation of PM is clearly implied above?
To get a handle on this question, we should reflect on what it is exactly about relativism that might give the 
theory an air of hocus-pocus for Plato. Consider: what would it mean to ‘assert’ a relative truth? Say I have a belief 
that I maintain to be true. According to a relativist reading of PM, all I can assert about this belief is that it’s true for 
me. If I am debating with someone my judgement that the earth is flat or that war is preventable, the Protagorean’s 
retort would presumably be: “Well, that’s just true for you.” There is no ‘fact of the matter’ in our debate and hence 
(importantly for Plato) nothing objective that we can argue about or say that will help us arrive at some shared 
understanding on an issue.
To assert a relative truth, accordingly, comes to much the same thing as making no assertion at all.35 Each 
time I attempt to claim something with sincerity or conviction, the spectre of Protagoras will pop up and allege that 
my claim is only true for me. But then he will have to retreat, since the allegation that he makes here—his own 
claim—will likewise only be true for him. On this view, the practice of inquiry and discussion seems futile. 
Relativism gives us an excuse to withdraw from such inquiry, an escape clause: since everything is relative, there 
may perhaps be no agreements we can come to during the course of an argument. It’s better, then, not to engage in 
discussion at all and assert nothing: to remain passive.
A crucial point to observe here is that this critique of relativism does not focus on a theoretical flaw in the 
doctrine but a practical flaw—if PM is taken relativistically, Protagoras’s view ought to be rejected simply because 35
(1977), p. 34 as sharing this view, at least with regard to 170D5-6. There is perhaps something to this interpretation, 
but as I point out below, there are other descriptions of Protagoras’s thesis in the Theaetetus that Fine does not 
consider which are blatantly relativist-sounding. In these cases it is difficult to see how such a reading of PM did 
not occur to Plato.
35 Cf. Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, translated by J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 1970), p. 139: “The 
content of such assertions rejects what is part of the sense or content of every assertion and what accordingly cannot 
be significantly separated from any assertion.” The reference is from Bumyeat (1990), p. 30-1.
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he cannot participate in any meaningful discussion.36 Indeed, it is difficult to comprehend in this sense how a 
relativist interpretation of PM can be a ‘theory’ at all. Articulating a theory involves communication and 
engagement with others—it entails putting some statement or another up for approval or disapproval that can be 
understood on independent grounds and analysed from different points of view. As a relativist, however, Protagoras 
forbids such communication through a disengagement from inquiry: each individual lives in his or her own 
solipsistic bubble, with no common basis between us for understanding and analysis. But when construed in this 
way, how is Protagoras himself articulating anything intelligible? His mantra “That’s just true for you” is, at best, a 
distraction or escape from argument. And if this is the case, we have no reason even to consider PM. A relativist 
interpretation of the doctrine must thus be abandoned for practical purposes.
This, I believe, provides Plato with just cause to ignore a relativist reading of PM. But did he see it? I think he 
did, and on examination there are moments in the Theaetetus where he highlights this practical flaw in the doctrine. 
Just after the passage above, in fact, when Socrates has at last brought Theaetetus’s “first-born child” to light, he 
begins to express qualms with Protagoras’s theory as it has been developed:
. . .  If whatever the individual judges by means of perception is true for him; if no man can assess another’s 
experience better than he, or can claim authority to examine another man’s judgment and see if it is right or wrong; 
if, as we have repeatedly said, only the individual himself can judge of his own world, and what he judges is always 
true and correct. . .  Can we avoid the conclusion that Protagoras was just playing to the crowd when he said this? I 
say nothing about my own case and my art of midwifery and how silly we look. So too, I think, does the whole 
business of philosophical discussion (dialegesthai pragmateia, 161e6). To examine and try to refute each other’s 
appearances and judgments, when each person’s are correct—this is surely an extremely tiresome piece of nonsense, 
if the Truth of Protagoras is true__ (161D2-1 62a2)
Again, it is difficult not to regard this passage as an indication that a relativist reading of PM occurred to Plato. 
Furthermore, we have here a clear suggestion of why he does not attempt to refute this version of the doctrine: it’s 
not practically feasible. Socrates affirms above that if Protagoras was a sincere relativist, the examination of other 
people’s judgements through patient inquiry and analysis would be a ridiculous affair. Not only this, but his art of 
midwifery (described at 150b6-151d6) and practical discussion itself (<dialegesthai pragmateia) seem entirely
futile.37 So the method we used above to reject relativism is corroborated: Plato cannot argue against such a 
position since it doesn’t allow for argument to begin with. Hence, he has no reason to consider it at all and must for 
practical purposes disregard this reading of PM.
8. Protagoras Laid to Rest
That just about completes my analysis of Plato’s arguments against Protagoras. On the one hand, I have contended 
against Bumyeat that Plato does not (indeed cannot) seek to refute a relativist interpretation of PM, that all 
judgements are true for (in relation to) each individual. Rather, I agree with Fine that Plato’s arguments in the 
dialogue work best when he is understood as arguing against an infallibilist interpretation of PM, that all judgements 
are true (period). On the other hand, I have also suggested that PM in its blunt form is an obscure doctrine that can 
be read as both a relativist thesis and an infallibilist thesis, and that Plato was mindful of both interpretations. 
Henceforth, I’ll refer to these interpretations as PMr and PM¡ respectively.
Now, I believe the conclusion that should be drawn here is as follows: in order for the agreements we reach 
with one another in the practice of discussion and inquiry to be even possible, there must (for Plato) be an objective 
way in which things are—truly are—that is independent of us. This is without doubt the principal difference 
between the relativist and the infallibilist. PMr denies that there is an objective way in which things truly are, and 367
36 Cf. John Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning (London: Duckworth, 1961), p. 67: “The fundamental criticism of 
Protagoras can now be put thus: to engage in discourse at all he has to assert that something is the case.” Bumyeat 
(1976), p. 190 considers this view and concurs that “Passmore’s criticism is essentially correct,” although he 
hesitates to say how clearly Plato saw this practical flaw in the doctrine (p. 195). See also p. 13n. 38, below.
37 Levett’s translation of dialegesthai pragmateia at 161E6 as “philosophical discussion” is not entirely accurate, 
for there’s no mention of philosophia in the Greek. John McDowell renders the phrase “business of dialectic” in 
his own translation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973). I prefer the more literal “practical discussion.”
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asserts that all appearances are merely true for each individual. In contrast, PMx accepts that there is an objective 
way in which things truly are, with the added proviso that things truly are the way they appear to be. It is because of 
this additional claim that Plato can engage in debate with Protagoras at 170A ff. and refute PM¡ by proving the 
doctrine inconsistent. In this case, Protagoras must agree as a result of certain premises that his theory contradicts 
itself.
This is emphasised repeatedly just before and throughout the self-refutation passage. Socrates regrets early on 
that Protagoras isn’t around to defend his doctrine and agree (hômologei, 169D10) with him. He informs Theodorus 
that they will have to come to closer grips with the doctrine and not reach agreements 0homologías, 169e3) on 
behalf of Protagoras, but wrest an agreement (homologian, 170A1) directly from his thesis. Subsequently, in Plato’s 
famous “exquisite” argument at 171A6-C7, Socrates asserts that since Protagoras agrees 0homologôn, 171a8) that all 
men judge what is, he is forced by his own lights to agree (homologei, 171B2) that his theory is false. For he must 
also agree (homologei, 171B6) that when others judge his doctrine false, they speak the truth. Hence, it will have to 
be agreed (homologesetai, 171B10) by Protagoras that no one is the measure of anything at all. This argument only 
works (as we have seen) when Plato is read as arguing against PM¡ rather than PMr because it is only on an 
infallibilist version of the Measure Doctrine that agreements are even possible: more precisely, PM¡ allows for 
independent and objective grounds between us for discussion and inquiry, while PMr denies that such grounds exist.
In this respect, the image that follows the self-refutation argument at 171C10-D5 is stunning. Plato conceives of 
Protagoras (literally) turning in his grave and emerging from the earth to denounce Socrates for arguing foolishly 
(elenxas lêrounta, 171d2) and to reprimand Theodorus, his erstwhile disciple, for agreeing (homologounta, 171D3) 
with Socrates’ conclusions. Having done so, however, Protagoras runs off without another word. To save his 
doctrine, he appears to resort here to the guise of a relativist, and we can well imagine his riposte to Socrates:
“That’s just true for you!” Yet note that by relying on PMr at this point he has no choice but to withdraw from 
argument. It is a striking feature of Plato’s image that Protagoras runs off after reproaching Socrates and
Theodorus. He has no grounds to stand by his theory and defend it in the practice of discussion.^
Thus we see again how Plato remains perfectly aware of a relativist reading of Protagoras’s doctrine, and we 
also see why he rejects relativism. In foreclosing the possibility of disagreements Protagoras also, critically, 
prevents us from reaching agreements. (Note how he rebukes Theodorus at 171D3 simply for agreeing with 
Socrates.) On this view the activities of discussion, participation, and rational inquiry that are at the heart of Plato’s 
philosophy remain prohibited. Protagoras advocates instead a passive model of human judgement in which critical 
thinking and understanding are ineffective enterprises. For if there is no objective way that things are independently 
of each of us, as the relativist maintains, then it seems we have no real basis on which to reach agreements with each
other.39 Our use of language to converse with and understand one another appears absurd. But if this is the case. 389
38 Bumyeat (1967), pp. 191-2 puts this point eloquently: “ If Protagoras does not speak to the human condition, 
does not put forward his claim that each of us lives in our own relativistic world as something we can all discuss 
and, possibly, come to accept, but simply asserts solipsistically that he, for his part, lives in a world in which this is 
so, then indeed there is no discussing with him. His world and his theory go to the grave with him, and Socrates is 
fully entitled to leave them there and get on with his inquiry.” Note, however, that at this point in his article (pp. 
190-5) Bumyeat focuses on what I’ve termed a practical flaw in PMr. He also reads the entire preceding passage in 
terms of this relativist reading and thinks that Plato’s self-refutation argument works for theoretical reasons (pp. 
172-89). In contrast, I have suggested (following Fine) that the self-refiitation passage is directed against PM¡ and 
that Plato’s argument only works on this reading of the doctrine. That is to say, PMr cannot be proven inconsistent 
theoretically, although Plato can (and, I have suggested, does) reject this version of the doctrine for practical 
reasons. I am not sure that Fine would agree with this latter claim—I suspect she would say it violates her 
“univocity criterion,” which requires PM to be construed in a univocal way throughout the Theaetetus (Fine, 
“Protagorean Relativisms,” p. 216). However, in this case we are left with the idea that Plato was either unaware of 
a relativist version of PM or that he didn’t think there was a way he could reject relativism. On my reading, Plato is 
absolved of this chariness.
391 have found Waterlow (1977) helpful here. She claims, for instance, that based on PMr “ it becomes impossible 
to see how Plato can legitimately say thaï Protagoras agrees with his opponents” (p. 31). Like Bumyeat, Waterlow 
believes that the entire self-refutation passage should be interpreted as an argument against PMr. Unlike Bumyeat, 
however, she claims that Plato’s arguments do not succeed in refuting PMr. The point Plato is stressing at 171a6-c7 
on her reading is “ [n]ot that Protagoras’ position ought for reasons of logic to be rejected by those who accept it;
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it’s worth asking whether Protagoras himself, as a relativist, can assert anything meaningful. Plato suggests that he 
does not, and although PMr cannot therefore be refuted on a theoretical basis, it can and should be rejected for 
practical purposes.
9. Heraclitean Flux
So far, I have argued that Plato’s key arguments against Protagoras in the Theaetetus are aimed against an 
infallibilist version of the Measure Doctrine, which states that the way things appear to be are the way they truly are 
(period) and that things truly are the way they appear to be. I’ve argued further that when read in this manner, the 
self-refutation passage at 170a ff. succeeds in proving that PM¡ is an inconsistent thesis. This is a theoretical flaw in 
Protagoras’s doctrine: on account of certain premises, the infallibilist must agree that his thesis is false. However, 
we have also touched on one of the more subtle features of PM¡ in its commitment to Heraclitean ontology of flux. 
On these grounds, Protagoras tries to claim that all judgements are absolutely true descriptions of the world—even 
conflicting judgements—because the world itself is in constant change. The reason the wind appears cold to me and 
not cold to you is because we are experiencing two different winds. So it’s important for us to analyse this “secret 
doctrine” more closely. In particular, can such an ontology provide the infallibilist with means to save his 
theory?^
Heraclitus’s thesis that everything undergoes change is a claim about the world: it asserts something about 
experience. Plato invokes the doctrine again at 179D1-4 and analyses it carefully at 181B8-183B5, for Protagoras 
was imagined earlier in the dialogue as challenging Socrates to reject two separate claims: first, “that all things are 
in motion” and, second, “that for each person and each city, things are what they seem to them to be” (168B4-6). 
Having analysed PM in depth, Plato now turns his attention to examining this “first principle” of the Measure 
Doctrine in greater detail (179E1). And the reason, Socrates suggests, is to prevent Protagoras from taking 
advantage of a possible escape route for his thesis: “We shall have to consider and test this moving Being, and find 
whether it rings true or sounds as if it had some flaw in it” (179d2-4). If this flaw in HF can be found, then Plato 
will presumably have a stronger case against PM.
Everything, Heracliteans claim, is in motion (kinêsis, 156A5), and when Plato tackles this principle at 181D5-6 
he classifies motion into two specific sorts: alteration (things undergoing change in character) and spatial movement 
(things undergoing change in place). All things suffer change in both these ways simultaneously (181D9-182A1). 
Moreover, Heracliteans declare, the experiences we have occur only as a result of such motion—through the 
association of a passive factor that becomes percipient (in the mind) and an active factor that becomes such-and- 
such (in the world). For instance, the experience of eating an apple might result in the claim, ‘It tastes sweet’
The percipient or passive factor here would be ‘tastes.’ The such-and-such or active factor would be ‘sweet.’ 
Observe at this point that the passive factor becomes percipient, but is not in itself a perception (‘tastes’ not the 
perception ‘taste’). Likewise, the active factor becomes such-and-such but is not in itself a quality (‘sweet’ not the 
quality ‘sweetness’). The theory is subtle, but the gist is that perceptions like ‘taste,’ ‘hearing,’ ‘touch,’ and ‘sight’ 
do not exist in isolation of their active factors, just as qualities like ‘sweetness,’ ‘loudness,’ ‘warmth,’ and 
‘whiteness’ do not exist in isolation of their passive factors: “it is by the association of the two with one another that 
they generate perceptions and the things perceived” (182B4-7). Hence, according to HF, we are caught in a world 
of flux that is ever-changing, transient, and becoming. There is no world of unchanging being-
How might Protagoras avail himself of this doctrine? Well, he can now boil all experience down to immediate 
perceptual judgement and invoke HF as an ontology of extreme flux that is not restricted to the perceptual sphere. 
Socrates had actually anticipated at 179C2-4 that it’s harder to refute PM in this case. For now Protagoras can say 40
but that those who reject it can have no reason even to consider accepting it. Protagoras rejects nothing that they 
assert in opposition.. . .  Thus an opponent confronting Protagoras’ position confronts, so to speak, a dialectical 
nothing, offering no resistance” (pp. 35-6). Although I disagree that Plato’s target at 171A6-C7 is relativism, I’m 
basically in agreement with Waterlow’s suggestion here that Plato’s rejection of PMr appeals (though she doesn’t 
use this term) to a practical flaw in relativism: to assert a relative truth is to assert nothing. Cf. also Bumyeat 
(1990), pp. 30-1.
40 We have already seen above (p. 10) why a relativist interpretation of PM cannot draw on an ontology of flux for 
support. For HF is an objective principle that takes it to be an absolute truth that the world is in constant change, 
whereas PMr denies the existence of such truths and principles.
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that all judgements are true (period) because the judgement ‘such-and-such’ at one moment is different at another 
moment. Everything undergoes continual change. In point of fact, as subjects we no longer even possess identity
over time.41 On this view, all judgements are guaranteed to be infallible because the things that we form 
judgements about are indefinite and unstable.
But if this is truly the case, Socrates contends, then we might as well say that the things we judge and our 
judgements don’t exist at all. For recall that there are two motions in the world occurring together according to HF: 
alterations in character and changes in place. When I perceive an apple as ‘sweet,’ then, even this active factor is in 
a process of alteration, and I cannot as a result ascribe any fixed name to it. The same goes for the passive factor: if 
nothing abides and everything alters, then even my experience of tasting will be in a state of flux. I might as well 
claim that I am not-tasting rather than I am tasting.
So consider a question I’m asked with regard to an experience I undergo: “How does it seem to you?” My 
answer to this question according to HF could be anything at all: both “it is thus” and “it is not-thus” would be 
equally valid replies and consistent with the doctrine (183a4-7). Or perhaps to be less definite about matters in the 
Heraclitean spirit we should use ‘becomes.’ But once we reach this point the purpose of naming things as being of a 
certain type, quality, value, etc. seems meaningless: “The exponents of this theory need to establish some other 
language,” Socrates concludes, to be consistent with their hypothesis (183B2-4), for language on this view is left
devoid of meaning: we are unable to assert anything.42
Now, the issue I want to underscore here is that this again indicates a practical flaw in HF. Based on an 
infallibilist interpretation of PM, then, we come to a conclusion that is remarkably compatible with the one we 
reached earlier based on a relativist interpretation of the doctrine. Bumyeat’s relativist and Fine’s infallibilist 
readings can accordingly be summarised as follows:
(PMr) Denies that there’s an objective way in which things truly are, and claims that all appearances are merely 
true for each individual. If Protagoras relies on an ontology of flux to explain this thesis, then his doctrine 
is inconsistent—for HF is a principle that describes an objective way in which things truly are. He would 
resort instead to asserting something peculiar about human judgement: all judgements are relatively true 
because each individual experiences the world in a special way. But to assert a relative truth is to assert 
nothing. If this is the case, Protagoras must retreat from argument (171c 10-d5). Inquiry is on this view 
pointless. Upshot: PMr is practically flawed.
(PM¡) Accepts that there’s an objective way in which things truly are, and claims that things truly are the way
they appear to be. Protagoras’s thesis is again inconsistent—for if (PM¡) all judgements are absolutely true, 
then the judgement ‘not-PM¡’ is absolutely true, which means that PM¡ is false (170a3-171c7).
Protagoras’s only recourse here is to assert something peculiar about the world: all judgements are 
absolutely true because (HF) all things are in flux. Each of us experiences different states of affairs. But in 
this case, the words we use to describe the world are incoherent. Inquiry (and language in general) is on 
this view impossible. Upshot: PM¡ is practically flawed.
The fact that the line of reasoning in the first part of the Theaetetus proceeds in accordance with this latter argument 
is a good indication that Fine’s infallibilist reading of PM is correct.43 plato can only engage in debate with PM¡ as 4123
41 This is actually a riposte Socrates imagines Protagoras making at 1 66b 1-Cl : “do you expect someone to grant 
you . . .  that the man, who is in process of becoming unlike, is the same as he was before the process began? Do 
you expect him even to speak of ‘the man’ rather than of ‘the men,’ indeed of an infinite number of these men 
coming to be in succession, assuming this process of becoming unlike?”
42 Cf. Theodorus’s blistering critique of HF at 179E2-180B3: “these Heraclitean doctrines . . .  you can’t discuss 
them in person with any of the people at Ephesus who profess to be adepts, any more than you could with a maniac. 
. . .  As for abiding by what is said, or sticking to a question, or quietly answering and asking questions in turn, there 
is less than nothing of that in their capacity.. . .  You will never reach any conclusion with any of them, ever. . .  
they are so very careful not to allow anything to be stable, either in any argument or in their own souls.”
43 It would, however, be remiss of me not to remark that Fine would disagree with the extra argument I make here 
against PM¡. The sticking point is that I see Protagoras drawing on an unrestricted version of HF outside the 
perceptual sphere (see p. 15) while she sees HF applying only to perceptions, not judgements. Fine considers
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it’s only this reading that, at least on the surface, permits the practice of discussion. That is to say, PM¡ admits at 
first of an objective basis on which we can participate with one another in shared analysis, whereas PMr rejects at 
the outset the possibility of any such basis.
Still, we can see above that there are theoretical flaws in each version of the doctrine, and that when pushed to 
their limits PMr and PM¡ must be rejected for practical reasons. Namely, if PM, were correct, we would not have 
grounds to reach agreements with one another through reasoning. If PM¡ were correct, on the other hand, we are left 
with the more devastating conclusion that there would be no agreements possible in judgement, between mind and 
world. On either view, Protagoras cannot be understood as saying anything meaningful. What’s more, the activities 
of argument and reflection that are staple features of Plato’s philosophical method are considered by PMr and PM¡ to
be either pointless or impossible.44
10. Making Inquiry Meaningful
At 1 84b4 we reach a turning point in the Theaetetus. Without warning, Socrates commences a second refutation of 
Theaetetus’s ‘knowledge is perception’ thesis—this time, however, by drawing on the nature of the soul rather than
experience.45 But how are PM and HF as we have read these doctrines related to Theaetetus’s initial empiricist 
thesis (KP)? On this issue, I am essentially in agreement with Bumyeat’s suggestion that a conception of
knowledge based solely on experience results for Plato in a reductio ad absurdum,4^ Two conditions are needed to 
validate the empiricist’s KP thesis: one must specify something about human judgement; the other must specify 
something about the world. The first condition is met with Protagoras’s Measure Doctrine; the second condition is 
met with Heraclitean flux.
But both are deemed inadequate. As we have seen, absurdities and inconsistencies abound between PM and 
HF. Protagoras, whether he is interpreted as a relativist or as an infallibilist, must resort to either a radical view of 
human judgement or a radical view of the world. Plato indicates, however, that there’s a deep-seated problem with
something like my argument in “Plato’s Refutation of Protagoras” but rejects it because she believes that Plato’s 
arguments at 181b8-183b5 do not countenance an expanded role for HF. Rather, HF “ is still restricted to the 
perceptual sphere” (p. 222n. 45). But I’m not sure why she thinks this. First, when restating HF Plato is quite clear 
in saying that all things are in flux {to pan kinêsis, 156A5), not that all perceptual things are in flux (see also 168B4- 
5 and 182a 1). Second, the main implication of Plato’s argument at 181b8-183b5 is that based on HF language 
breaks down. But if Heraclitus’s thesis is restricted exclusively to the perceptual sphere, it’s not clear to me why all 
our words would be incoherent; at best, the terms we use to describe perceptual experiences would be meaningless. 
However, this leaves open the possibility of, say, ethical and other non-perceptual discourse. Language as a whole 
can only break down if HF is taken in an unrestricted sense. There’s more to be said on this point, but at any rate 
Fine grants that if one assumes (as I do) that Plato does allow Protagoras to use an unrestricted version of HF, then 
the practical flaw in PM¡ that I have emphasised above is justifiably obtained. For in this case “Protagoras can’t 
even articulate, let alone defend, his position” (Fine, “Plato’s Refutation of Protagoras,” p. 222n. 45).
44 Plato’s concern with keeping open the possibility of philosophical·discussion and inquiry crops up throughout the 
later dialogues. See, e.g., Sophist 260A5-7, where the Visitor contends that if we were deprived of logos we’d be 
deprived of “the most important thing” of all, i.e. philosophy; and Statesman 299E7-9, where Young Socrates 
asserts that if inquiry were prohibited in a city, life itself would be stifled.
45 See Bumyeat (1990), p. 53. This is a direct proof proceeding from premises that Plato himself believes to be 
true, in contrast to the indirect proof that we’ve been examining until now. See also p. 4n. 10, above.
46 Bumyeat (1990) offers this reading as a rival to the usual scholarly interpretation of the Theaetetus (“Reading 
A”) that Plato is endorsing PM and HF as acceptable accounts of perception, but denying that they yield knowledge. 
On his interpretation (“Reading B”), Bumyeat believes Plato is making an argument that’s much more anti­
empiricist: “Plato does not accept the theories of Protagoras and Heraclitus. Theaetetus is made to accept them 
because, having defined knowledge as perception, he is faced with the question, What has to be true of perception 
and of the world for the definition to hold good? The answer suggested is that he will have to adopt a Protagorean 
epistemology, and that in turn will commit him to a Heraclitean account of the world” (p. 9). Note, though, that 
Bumyeat takes Plato to be arguing against a relativist thesis here, whereas I take him with Fine to be arguing against 
an infallibilist thesis.
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the picture of knowledge, mind, and world that Protagoras’s view represents. What picture is this? Plato need not 
be arguing here that experience has no role whatsoever to play in knowledge—all he seems to claim is that 
perception cannot constitute knowledge of its own accord. The problem here, then, is that based on KP alone we 
are left with a picture of the human being as a passive consumer, so to speak, of experience: the mind is inert and 
acted upon by an unstable world that is only ever in a process of change. Knowledge from this vantage point is 
wholly indeterminate. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly of all for Plato, human inquiry and discussion 
are emptied of meaning on this empiricist view. The outcome of the reduction therefore, is that the definition 
“knowledge is simply perception” (151 El-3) is both impossible and incoherent. There must be something more to 
this picture of knowledge, mind, and world than perception alone.
So what does Plato’s alternative picture look like? I have suggested in this paper that the principal arguments 
of the Theaetetus are concerned in large part with challenging a Protagorean epistemology that emphasises the 
passivity of human judgement, in which the way things are judged to be are the way they really are. I’ve also 
shown how theoretical issues in the dialogue give way to issues of practice, in which the search for an answer to the 
question of knowledge quickly provokes the need to make inquiry itself a worthwhile endeavour. Plato tackles both 
these concerns in the second part of the Theaetetus by shifting his focus to a more anti-empiricist argument. Here, 
in submitting his own view of judgement, he provides a response to the Protagorean view while at the same time 
providing a basis on which the understandings we arrive at through rational inquiry are meaningful. If, in spite of 
all this, the question of knowledge remains unsettled, we can at least say that Plato affords us grounds for further 
investigation.
The pivotal moment comes at 186D2-3, where Socrates maintains that “knowledge is found not in the 
experiences (pathêmasin, 186d2) but in the process of reasoning (sullogismôi, 186d3) about them.” Presumably, in 
focusing on processes of reasoning rather than experiences, Plato believes that agreements are arrived at only on the 
basis of such processes. But how? Recall that agreements couldn’t be reached on the empiricist view because 
Protagoras’s thesis provided either an escape from argument (if PMr), was self-refuting (if PM¡), or incoherent (if 
PMj + HF). Hence the advantages of Plato’s anti-empiricist view will be that, on the epistemological side, the mind 
has an active role to play in its analysis of experience and, on the ontological side, the world has an element of
stability existing independently of us rather than an ever-changing nature that depends on our perception of it.4^
To justify his practice of dialectic as a meaningful endeavour, it is important to see that both these conditions 
have to be satisfied for Plato: we must have active minds so as to grasp being and truth and reach agreements with 
one another (in language); and we must have a stable world so as to have anything to talk about, so that our thought 
agrees with the way things are (in judgement). Now, disagreements are certain to arise on this view. We might 
disagree, for example, that the wind is cold or that the earth is round. In matters of ethics, we might disagree that 
justice is more beneficial than injustice or that stealing is wrong. We might even disagree that 2 + 2 is 4 or that 
murder is always wicked. It does not strike me that disputes such as these are out of keeping with Plato’s project in 
the Theaetetus. What is crucial for him is that we have an arena within which to resolve such disagreements, 
whereas we aren’t provided with this arena in the first part of the dialogue. By appealing to processes of reasoning 
as the seat of knowledge, then, Plato holds that these processes are capacities we share in common. Mere 
appearances, by contrast, are variable and indefinite. What you and I experience at a certain time may naturally 
differ, but our capacities to reflect on these experiences should remain the same. And Plato believes that it is 
ultimately these common practices of reasoning that enable us to reach agreements with one another, through which 
inquiry is found to be a valuable enterprise.
This provides a sketch, at least, of what Plato’s alternative picture looks like. A full analysis of the second part 
of the dialogue must be shelved for another time, but I’ve provided here a few salient features of his method in the 
Theaetetus. In conclusion, we can say that the dialogue lays down two requirements that any noteworthy theory of 
knowledge must satisfy: an epistemological one and an ontological one. The epistemological requirement stresses 
that the mind must be actively engaged in experience in forming judgements and not completely passive. The 
ontological requirement—barely alluded to in the dialogue, but implicit nonetheless—stresses that there is 
something objective about the world itself independently of us that makes it correct to judge things to be one way
47 Frede (2000), pp. 381-4 makes this point especially well in his examination of the emphasis that Plato places on 
the amount of mental activity involved in judgement-formation, as opposed to a very restricted notion of perception 
(i.e., as a passive affection of the mind).
SAGP Newsletter 2003/4.2(2/23/04) p. 21
rather than another. It is on these grounds alone, Plato suggests, that the question of knowledge and the practice of 
dialectic are meaningful.
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